The Sunken Vessels of Chauncey and Yeo in Lake Ontario by Ford, Ben
Northeast Historical Archaeology
Volume 44 Special Issue: War of 1812 Article 8
2015
The Sunken Vessels of Chauncey and Yeo in Lake
Ontario
Ben Ford
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/neha
Part of the Archaeological Anthropology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in
Northeast Historical Archaeology by an authorized editor of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact
ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ford, Ben (2015) "The Sunken Vessels of Chauncey and Yeo in Lake Ontario," Northeast Historical Archaeology: Vol. 44 44, Article 8.
Available at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/neha/vol44/iss1/8
Northeast Historical Archaeology/Vol. 44, 2015 133
Introduction
 The naval campaigns on Lake Ontario 
were important in terms of controlling the 
North American interior and the War of 1812 
in general, as both sides struggled to control 
this natural inland highway. But the campaigns 
were largely strategic, with the squadrons of 
Isaac Chauncey (American) and Sir James 
Lucas Yeo (British) often jockeying for position, 
rather than engaging in pitched battles. At the 
beginning of the war, the British had a small 
squadron of four vessels (Royal George, Earl of 
Moira, Prince Regent, and Duke of Gloucester) 
and dockyards at Kingston and York (now 
Toronto), while the Americans had only one 
purpose-built warship, Oneida, and no dockyard 
(Malcomson 1998). Responding to this situation, 
in September 1812 Chauncey established a 
naval shipyard at Sackets Harbor, New York, 
under the supervision of Henry Eckford (fig. 
1). By late 1814, the Sackets Harbor naval station 
was home to approximately 2,500 sailors and 
marines, and would produce nearly ten warships 
by the close of the war (Gibson 2012d). The 
British matched the Americans, as both sides 
strove to control the lake. Robert Malcomson 
(1998) provides an excellent history of the war 
on Lake Ontario, and, along with Kevin 
Crisman (2014b), Malcomson (2004) places the 
Lake Ontario theater within the larger naval 
struggle for control of the Great Lakes and 
Lake Champlain.
 In many ways ship construction was the 
war on Lake Ontario. With the exception of a 
few skirmishes and amphibious attacks, there 
were no all-out battles on the lake; instead, it 
was something of a “cold war,” or what 
Malcomson (1998: 225) has termed: “the war of 
the dockyards,” as the shipbuilders at 
Kingston and Sackets Harbor worked to give 
their commodores a significant advantage in 
vessels and cannon. This advantage never 
came; the shipyards were too evenly matched, 
and neither Chauncey nor Yeo would risk an 
engagement that he could not definitely win, 
because both understood the importance of 
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River for 
controlling of the interior. Additionally, the 
naval operations were regularly subjugated to 
army needs, meaning that both commodores 
were often fulfilling support roles, rather than 
pursuing their own agendas (Malcomson 
1998; Crisman 2014d). The result was much 
maneuvering of squadrons during the sailing 
season and feverish construction throughout 
the war. Very few vessels, consequently, were 
lost during the war, but many naval shipwrecks 
from the period exist. This article summarizes 
the archaeological potential of the squadrons 
of Chauncey and Yeo.
Wartime Losses
 Only three vessels were lost during the 
war. The converted merchant schooners 
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Hamilton (ex-Diana) and Scourge (ex–Lord 
Nelson) capsized during a storm on 8 August 
1813. Their demise was recounted in a dramatic 
style by Ned Myers in telling his life’s story to 
James Fenimore Cooper, eventually leading to 
the vessels’ discovery in a state of spectacular 
preservation in 1973 (Cain 1983; Nelson 1983; 
Cooper 1989; McAllister 2008; Moore 2014a). 
Another converted merchantman, Magnet (ex–
Governor Simcoe and ex–Sir Sidney Smith), was 
run aground and blown up by the British 10 
mi. west of the Niagara River on 5 August 
1814 in order to avoid capture by American 
vessels Lady of the Lake and Sylph (Malcomson 
1998:291–292). Additionally, there is likely a 
wealth of War of 1812 bateaux, Durham boats, 
and other small craft littering the bottoms of 
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. For 
example, General James Wilkinson’s disastrous 
1813 invasion of Canada left a trail of sunken 
small craft from Sackets Harbor to the Salmon 
River near Fort Covington, New York (Ashdown 
2012). However, this article focuses primarily 
on the larger, armed, sailing vessels produced 
by the primary shipyards at Kingston and 
Sackets Harbor.
 It should not be surprising, however, that 
the naval War of 1812 on Lake Ontario produced 
only the wrecks of Hamilton and Scourge, the 
smithereens of Magnet, and a number of yet-
undiscovered small craft. During the Battle of 
Lake Erie, where Oliver Hazard Perry and the 
Americans bested the British squadron in an 
intense three-hour battle of 15 vessels, not a 
single one was sunk. Recent archaeological 
work, by the Great Lakes Historical Society, to 
identify where the battle took place looked for 
concentrations of iron shot on the lake floor, not 
shipwrecks. The comparatively more cautious 
strategies of Sir James Lucas Yeo and Isaac 
Chauncey allowed the majority of the vessels 
on Lake Ontario to survive the war and return 
to their respective dockyards to await their 
various fates. Thus, the naval stations at 
Kingston and Sackets Harbor, which figured 
so prominently during the war, were also 
important in the postwar lives of these vessels 
and the archaeological search for what remains 
of the squadrons of Chauncey and Yeo.
Dismantling the Squadrons
 The first vessels to leave the squadrons 
were the small vessels. Not long after peace 
was declared, the Americans sold the merchant 
vessels they had bought or seized and then 
armed at the beginning of the war to bolster 
their forces. In some cases these vessels were 
sold back to the same merchants who had 
owned them before the war (Palmer 1984a). 
These were the sister vessels of Hamilton and 
Scourge, and included Duke of Gloucester, which 
Figure 1. Map of locations mentioned in the text. (Map by author, 2013.)
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the Americans had captured at York. Either 
originally built as merchant vessels or small 
enough to be adapted to the ports and economies 
of the time, these vessels were readily employed 
as trade rebounded on the lake.
 The larger vessels were retained while the 
details of the peace were sorted out. With the 
signing of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818, 
which limited the armament of Great Britain 
and America to one vessel on the lake of not 
more than “100 tones burthen and 18 pounder 
gun,” the status quo that had persisted 
throughout the war was formalized, and it was 
time to disarm Lake Ontario (Malcomson 1998, 
2004). The warships were placed in ordinary, or 
storage, at their respective dockyards. They 
were securely moored and cleaned, their decks 
were boarded over to keep out water, and 
they were staffed with a skeleton crew for 
maintenance and to man the pumps (fig. 2). 
Neither side was initially prepared to get rid 
of its squadron; the vessels represented a 
substantial investment, and it was an uneasy 
time between America and Britain.
 Despite having crews to maintain them, 
decay began to set in, and plank seams began 
to open up. Ship keepers on both sides of the 
international boundary would periodically 
find one of their charges resting on the bottom 
of the harbor, usually listing heavily to one 
side––neither a natural nor healthy position 
for a vessel. By the early 1820s, most of the 
American vessels at Sackets Harbor were being 
described as “sunk and decayed,” and there was 
an increasing call for their removal (U.S. Congress 
1823, 1824) By 1825, much of the American 
squadron had been broken up and removed 
(Hugunin 1825). Anything usable from the 
vessels was taken: fittings, nails, and bolts for 
the iron; wood was likely sold for firewood or 
as scrap. The stored vessels, with the exceptions 
of Sylph, Madison, and Oneida, which were 
refitted as merchant vessels, were nearly wiped 
clean from the archaeological record. A similar 
pattern took place at Kingston during the early 
1830s, resulting in the breaking up of most of 
the British squadron (Moore 2006, 2014b).
 In the case of both nations, the destruction 
of the squadron included vessels left on the 
stocks. The battle for lake supremacy had gone 
on right up to the declaration of peace and, in 
some cases, for a few weeks afterward (Gibson 
2012d). The British left Canada and Wolfe on 
the stocks, and both were dismantled in the 
early 1830s (Moore 2006). It is likely the 
American ship Chippewa was also broken up at 
approximately the same time (Gibson 2012d). 
The massive 2,948 tons burden, New Orleans, 
however, remained on Navy Point at Sackets 
Harbor until the winter of 1883/4, becoming 
something of a tourist attraction.
 Nonetheless, the destruction of the 
squadrons was not complete. Due to chance, 
entrepreneurship, and a bit of laziness, the 
remains of approximately a dozen British and 
American warships endure. Of these, seven 
have been discovered, and a similar number 
may still remain to be found. Tables 1 and 2 
summarize the disposition of the two squadrons 
(Palmer 1984a; Malcomson 2004; Moore 2006, 
2008, 2014a, 2014b; Swayze 2011; Gibson 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d; Kopp 2012; Lardas 
2012; Amer 2014; Crisman 2014a, 2014b, 
2014d). Where there is a question about the 
fate of a vessel or the identity of a wreck, the 
disposition is modified with a question mark. 
Figure 2. American squadron in ordinary at Sackets Harbor, ca. 1816. New Orleans is in the barn-like structure on 
the right that dominates Navy Point (Hall 1818). (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.)
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and from the sternpost nearly to the stem. It 
was this good state of preservation that finally 
allowed both wrecks to be identified after being 
un- and misidentified into the late 20th century 
(Moore 2006, 2014b). These wrecks are open for 
diving by the public and are accessible to scuba 
divers interested in the War of 1812 period.
 Two additional British vessels may have 
been identified near the Kingston dockyard. 
Montreal and Charwell (ex–Earl of Moira) are 
known to have waited in ordinary alongside 
St. Lawrence, Kingston, and Burlington before 
being disposed. The hulk of Montreal may 
have been towed out of Navy Bay and deposited 
in deeper water, as what is known as Guenter’s 
Wreck closely matches the dimensions of 
Montreal in many ways (Moore 2008, 2012). 
The likely remains of Charwell have also 
recently been tentatively identified within 
Navy Bay (Moore 2008, 2012; Kopp 2012). 
While very promising, these wrecks require 
further study to identify them definitively as 
War of 1812 vessels. Finally, the Browns Bay 
vessel is often discussed in conjunction with 
Lake Ontario War of 1812 shipwrecks. The 
wreck raised from Browns Bay is likely the 
remains of Radcliffe, a gunboat launched in 
1817 and eventually converted into a merchant 
sloop (Amer 2014).
 Two American wrecks also have been 
studied by Canadian researchers. Hamilton and 
Scourge both sank north of the international 
line, in approximately 300 ft. of water. Their 
depth led to phenomenal preservation, with 
masts, figureheads, and armaments intact, 
making these wrecks international stars when 
they were discovered in 1973 (Nelson 1983). 
The U.S. eventually transferred the wrecks to 
the City of Hamilton, Ontario, and they were 
made a Canadian National Historic Site. The 
sites are protected under the Ontario Heritage 
Act, which regulates diving, submersible, and 
survey operations in their vicinities. This is 
particularly appropriate, as these wrecks are 
war graves, with skeletons noted during the 
initial survey. More recently, both shipwrecks 
were surveyed between 2007 and 2013 using 
sonar systems to create three-dimensional 
records of both vessels’ exteriors. This investi-
gation found that the vessels were infested 
with quagga mussels (Dreissena rostriformis 
bugensis) (Moore et al. 2011; Moore 2014a). 
These invasive mussels cause deterioration of 
One of the jobs for future archaeologists and 
historians is to locate the remains of the vessels 
marked as “missing” or to show definitively 
that they were destroyed with no chance of 
physical remains.
Archaeological Remains of the Lake 
Ontario Squadrons
 As Canadian archaeologists have done a 
much better job of locating and identifying the 
physical history of the British squadron, it is 
appropriate to begin with the wrecks north of 
the international boundary. St. Lawrence was a 
massive 102-gun ship, measuring 191 ft. long. 
It would have looked at home among the 
largest ships in the British saltwater navy, but 
never saw action, as it was operational for 
only the last months of the war. After being 
laid up at Kingston for almost 20 years, the 
“immense uncouth ark” was sold to Robert 
Drummond, who had it pumped out and 
towed from Navy Bay on the east side of 
Kingston to the Morton Brewery west of town 
(Moore 2006: 28, 2014b). The ship was then 
sunk parallel to the shore, cut down to facilitate 
access from the water, and attached to land 
with a pier in order to make it a cordwood 
wharf for refueling steamers. Constant impacts 
from loading steamboats and the ravages of 
waves and ice clearly took a toll on the hull, as 
today all that remains is the lower portion of one 
side of the vessel. Because neither the keel nor 
enough of the ends survive, it is unknown which 
side of the vessel is present (Moore 2006, 2014b).
 While St. Lawrence was moved west, two 
other vessels were moved east and sunk in 
Deadman Bay. Burlington and Kingston were 
both placed in ordinary at the Kingston Naval 
Yard and then sold in 1832, but they were not 
moved until sometime between 1839 and 1843. 
At that time they were pumped out and towed 
to a more out-of-the-way location east of Point 
Henry, where they were deposited. These 
wrecks have been well studied by Preserve 
Our Wrecks, Parks Canada, and Texas A&M 
University (Moore 2006, 2014b; Walker 2006). 
In conjunction with St. Lawrence, Burlington 
and Kingston, because they are so well preserved, 
provide the best evidence of how the British 
were building vessels on Lake Ontario. The 
lower hulls of both vessels survive from the 
keel to the turn of the bilge on the port side 
Northeast Historical Archaeology/Vol. 44, 2015 137
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proposition. The survey revealed no wreck or 
portion of a vessel consistent with Mohawk 
(Ford et al. 2012; Gibson 2014). It appears that the 
hull was dumped in this location, but is no 
longer present; was deposited farther out in 
the lake; or, most likely, was broken up in the 
harbor and removed.
 Similar to Mohawk, there was some possibility 
that 15, 75 ft. long armed barges built by the 
Americans near the end of the war were still 
extant. Like much of the squadron, the armed 
barges were placed in ordinary in 1815, but at 
Storrs Harbor, rather than Sackets Harbor. 
Near the end of the war, the U.S. developed a 
second shipyard at Storrs Harbor, approxi-
mately 3 mi. northeast of Sackets Harbor, to 
build Chippewa, which was never completed 
(Gibson 2012d). One of the armed barges 
broke its mooring in a storm sometime before 
1818 and drifted onto a sandbar near the junction 
of Muskellunge Creek and Black River Bay 
(U.S. Naval Forces on Lake Ontario 1818; 
Gibson 2012d). The location of this armed 
barge is indicated on an 1829 chart and possibly 
appears as a small, unnamed obstruction on 
another chart seven years later (Vinton 1829; 
Stockton 1836). After 1836, the wreck was no 
longer indicated on charts, and it is unknown 
whether it was covered by the shoal, removed, 
or destroyed. The remaining 14 armed barges 
were still in Storrs Harbor in 1825, but resting 
on the bottom when they were sold (Adams 
1825). At least three of these vessels were later 
removed to Sackets Harbor, but the fate of the 
rest is unknown (Gary Gibson 2014, pers. 
comm.). In order to investigate the possibility 
that these boats were allowed to remain in Storrs 
Harbor after they were sold, a magnetometer 
and “shuffling” survey was conducted in the 
harbor. The results of the survey were negative, 
suggesting that the armed barges had been 
removed from the harbor. As for the 15th 
armed barge that wrecked on the sandbar, a 
magnetometer survey and ground penetrating 
radar survey conducted from the frozen lake 
surface suggested that something was buried 
near where the 1829 chart marked the wreck. 
An excavation in this area, however, did not 
uncover any evidence of a shipwreck. It is 
possible that this armed barge is still buried in 
the bay, but its location remains unknown 
(Ford et al. 2012).
wood and metal, and their added weight 
could speed the almost inevitable collapse of 
the shipwrecks.
 While Hamilton and Scourge were converted 
merchant vessels, only one purpose-built 
Lake Ontario American warship has been 
archaeologically investigated, the brig 
Jefferson. Jefferson was sold with much of the 
American squadron in 1825, but was only 
partially salvaged, if at all. By 1825, the hull 
was lying on its port side behind Navy Point 
at Sackets Harbor, possibly allowing salvagers 
to break up the exposed starboard side (fig. 3). 
If they did not, locals seeking firewood almost 
certainly did. Naval shipbuilding had nearly 
deforested the region around Sackets Harbor, 
and wood had to be transported several miles, 
at a steep cost, for many years after the war. 
The rest of the hull, however, remained largely 
undisturbed in Sackets Harbor into the 20th 
century. During the first quarter of the 1900s, 
the stern was dynamited by the New York 
State Militia in a spate of harbor clearing. 
Additionally, the construction of Navy Point 
Marina in the 1960s resulted in pilings being 
driven through the wreck. Some of the pilings 
passed harmlessly though gun ports, but 
others damaged the hull. Jefferson’s remains 
were investigated in the 1980s by Kevin 
Crisman, providing the foundation for the 
understanding of American shipbuilding on 
Lake Ontario during the War of 1812 
(Crisman 1989, 2014a). This wreck is also the 
most accessible of the War of 1812 vessels. 
With permission, it is possible to walk out on 
the marina docks and see portions of the hull 
lying on the marina bottom, making this vessel 
a very tangible part of War of 1812 heritage.
 The fact that Jefferson survived in Sackets 
Harbor after it was sold and supposedly 
broken up raised the question of whether 
other wrecks are still in the area. One other 
large vessel, likely Mohawk, remained in the 
harbor until 1829, when William Vaughan was 
contracted to remove it (Mordecai 1828a, 
1828b, 1829). It is not clear how he removed 
the vessel, however. One possibility is that he 
refloated the already-demasted hull and 
dumped it in the middle of Black River Bay, 
just outside Sackets Harbor, where the water is 
approximately 60 ft. deep. A side-scan sonar, 
magnetometer, and sub-bottom profiler survey 
of Black River Bay was conducted to test this 
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are better known. Both vessels eventually 
found themselves in the lumber trade, one of 
the major industries on Lake Ontario in the 
early 19th century. Both vessels were abandoned 
in the late 1830s or early 1840s off Clayton, 
New York, a major lumber port, where sticks 
of timber were assembled into rafts to be 
floated down the St. Lawrence River to 
Montreal (Palmer 1984a, 1984b). It is unclear, 
however, what happened to these vessels after 
they were abandoned. It is possible that one 
was largely broken up and eventually buried 
in fill near the current site of the Wooden Boat 
Museum, while the other may have been 
incorporated into a pier (Watertown Herald 
1888; Gibson 2012a, 2012c). There is a local 
tradition that Oneida is located beneath the 
municipal dock in Clayton; however, the 
possible remains have not been seen since the 
1970s (McCarthy 2009).
 Lastly, Lady of the Lake still may remain to 
be found. This small schooner was built for 
speed and appears again and again in the 
historical records, all over the lake, carrying 
information and keeping tabs on the British. 
Lady of the Lake was purchased by John 
Rodgers of Oswego in 1826, and after a season 
of serving as a packet between Niagara and 
 While it is becoming clear that New Yorkers 
were brutally effective in clearing warships 
from their harbors during the 19th century, 
there is still the potential that vessels sold out 
of the service may survive as shipwrecks. 
Madison was sold in 1825, cut down to 302 
tons, and renamed General Brady. The vessel 
was still in use in 1829, but fades from the 
historical record and does not appear in 
records of known losses (Swayze 2011; Gibson 
2012b). This brig, which was two times larger 
than most of the merchant vessels operating 
on Lake Ontario, may have been too large to 
be viable. However, size alone may not have 
been the cause of its short career. Oneida and 
Sylph also were nearly 300 tons and served 
merchants for more than a decade after being 
sold out of the service, so it is equally possible 
that the postwar modifications that reduced 
Madison from 580 to 302 tons may have 
affected its sailing qualities. Madison likely 
ended its career, similar to many smaller mer-
chant vessels, in a breaker’s yard; however, it 
may have also been abandoned in some quiet 
bay, waiting for an archaeologist to stumble 
across its hull and to raise questions about its 
odd construction.
 Oneida and Sylph also were converted to 
merchant vessels, but their final resting places 
Figure 3. Hull of Jefferson lying behind Navy Point with the New Orleans shiphouse in the background (Everts 
and Holcom 1878).
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steeply from the keel to the turn of the bilge, 
offering less water resistance, but sacrificing 
provision space and safety. While these vessels 
were also shallower than oceangoing warships, 
they were, nonetheless, designed to operate in 
the open lake and to dock in the few deep 
harbors at places like Kingston, Sackets 
Harbor, and Niagara, not to take advantage of 
the more common shallow harbors around the 
lake. With their home ports always within 193 
mi., it was possible to build shallow but sharp 
hulls because they did not have to carry many 
provisions (Crisman 2014c). Clearly, both 
sides were modifying what they knew of ship 
construction to match the environment and 
needs of naval warfare on Lake Ontario. They 
were building specific vessels for specific uses 
in specific parts of the lake. While these vessels 
were fast and handy, these characteristics came 
at the cost of safety. The Jefferson crew was 
forced to jettison half its guns in an 1814 storm 
to keep from sinking, and a recent study of the 
American schooners Newash and Tecumseth on 
Lake Huron reinforces just how prone to capsizing 
these vessels were (Crisman 1989, 2014a; Gordon 
2009; Gordon, Hoskins, and Heinold 2014).
 Similarly, both shipyards were working 
under incredibly demanding construction 
schedules; turning out vessels in months, 
sometimes weeks. Based on the known 
archaeological examples of Jefferson, Kingston, 
Burlington, and St. Lawrence, the shipbuilders 
were building solid vessels, but to save time 
they often opted to replace complicated joinery 
Toronto was returning to Oswego when it was 
lost in a December storm (Colton 1876; Bureau 
of Marine Inspection and Navigation 1911). 
Interestingly, the wreck was noted the following 
August, 3 mi. from Oswego, in “deep water ... 
masts and booms lying at her sides where it 
would seem they had been lashed previous to 
her sinking” (Freeman’s Advocate 1827). It is 
unknown whether the wreck was allowed to 
remain on the bottom after its discovery, or it 
was refloated and put back into service. Finding 
this shipwreck, if it remains, would address the 
mystery of its loss, while simultaneously 
adding considerably to the understanding of 
American War of 1812 ship construction and 
the development of the Baltimore-clipper 
vessel type.
The Value of War of 1812 Shipwrecks
 While there is clearly room for more 
work on Lake Ontario War of 1812 ships and 
shipwrecks, archaeologists can begin to see 
patterns in the available data. In many ways 
the American and British shipbuilders paralleled 
each other throughout the war. As Robert 
Malcomson (1998) has effectively argued, each 
side was matching the other, gun for gun, and 
in many ways the vessels existed as a byproduct, 
a way to get guns onto the lake. The parallels 
run deeper, however, and both sides had similar 
responses to the strategic advantages and 
limitations of operating on the lake. Both sides 
were building vessels with sharp hulls (Moore 
2012) (fig. 4). A sharp hull is one that slopes 
Figure 4. Simplified midship profiles of Oneida, Jefferson, and Burlington. Note that Burlington and Jefferson have 
more rise to their floors and sharper bilges than the pre-war Oneida. Profiles are based on Chapelle (1949), 
Crisman (1989), and Moore (2006); not drawn to scale. (Figure by author, 2013.)
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Americans at the beginning of the war averaged 
78 tons displacement, and by the third decade 
of the 19th century the average lake vessel 
displaced only 150 tons (Minnesota Historical 
Society 2012). Thus, it is little surprise that 
Lady of the Lake, Oneida (262 tons), Sylph (300 
tons), and the modified Madison (302 tons) 
were the only American vessels that were 
purchased by merchants; the next-smallest 
vessels were Jefferson and Jones at 500 tons 
displacement (Gibson 2012b; Lardas 2012). 
Cargo shipments at this time were generally 
small, and filling a large vessel simply meant 
more risk of loss and that fewer ports could be 
served. While the Americans had some success 
disposing of their smaller vessels to local 
merchants in 1825, the Royal Navy did not 
attempt to sell any of its vessels until 1831, 
when St. Lawrence was sold. By the time the 
Royal Navy held a second auction in 1836, the 
remaining vessels were likely so decayed that 
they were only suitable for scrap. Radcliffe, the 
sole British War of 1812-era vessel converted to 
merchant service, was likely sold between 
1831 and 1836 (Amer 2014). The final parallel 
between the squadrons of Chauncey and Yeo 
was the difficulty in getting rid of the vessels. 
Even when the vessels were sold or a contract 
was taken to remove them, buyers seem to 
have been inclined to leave many of the hulks 
lying around long after they were to have been 
removed.
 If the remains of Oneida or Duke of Gloucester 
can be identified, or the wreck of Charwell 
substantiated, it will allow for a comparison 
between vessels built before the war and those 
built during it (Kopp 2012). These vessels, all 
launched between 1805 (Earl of Moira) and 
1809 (Royal George and Oneida), were purpose-
built warships designed to operate on Lake 
Ontario, but were not subject to the exigencies 
that dominated the wartime arms race. A 
comparison of these vessels will shed light on 
how drastically hull design and construction 
was adapted during the war. If it is ever possible 
to record the interiors of Hamilton and Scourge, this 
comparison can be expanded to understanding 
differences between merchant ships and warships 
on Lake Ontario before the war. Furthermore, 
if more of the American wartime vessels 
(Madison, Sylph, and Lady of the Lake) can be 
identified and studied, this will allow a fuller 
comparison of British and American adaptations 
with more wood (Crisman 1989, 2014a, 2014c; 
Moore 2006, 2012, 2014b). In Jefferson, for 
example, the curved timber knees that support 
the deck in most wooden vessels built before 
and after the War of 1812 were replaced with a 
heavy clamp that attached the deck to the 
sides. Omitting the knees saved time because 
there was less timber to shape, but also made 
Jefferson less durable, especially in rough weather 
(Crisman 1989, 2014a). Similarly, neither the 
British nor the Americans took the time to cut 
limber holes––the little notches in the frame 
bottoms that allow water to drain toward the 
pumps. This omission, again, shaved time off 
construction, but, in combination with the 
green timber used by both shipyards, made rot 
an imminent inevitability. The British vessels 
also demonstrated a surprising amount of 
variation in hull construction (Moore 2006, 
2014b), suggesting that individual shipwrights 
were given a free hand to solve design and 
logistics problems, rather than relying on 
standard protocols. Thus, the vessels of both 
sides were fast to build, fast to sail, but neither 
entirely safe nor durable. As Noah Brown put 
it in describing the vessels he was building on 
Lake Erie: 
[W]e want no extras; plain work, plain work 
is all we want. They are only required for one 
battle; if we win, that is all that will be 
wanted of them. If the enemy are victorious, 
the work is good enough to be captured. 
(Malcomson 2004: 90)
 These hull designs and expedient decisions, 
as well as the size of the vessels, made it difficult 
for the Americans to sell their vessels after the 
war. The Lake Ontario warships of America 
and Great Britain were built specifically for 
war, not the average ports or cargo needs of 
merchant vessels. A vessel that was prone to 
capsize spectacularly or to rot quietly from the 
keel out was not necessarily a good investment, 
even at a reduced cost. While removing the 
cannon and reducing the amount of sail would 
have made these vessels less dangerous, it is 
not unreasonable to hypothesize that hull 
design contributed to the loss of Lady of the 
Lake, remembering that it was a notably fast 
vessel in a squadron of vessels that regularly 
traded speed for safety. Lady of the Lake is also 
notable because its size (89 tons) put it in the 
range of merchant vessels of that period. The 
merchant vessels purchased or seized by the 
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Eckford designed and oversaw the construction 
of eight warships, all of which had unique 
characteristics that identified them as Eckford 
designs created specifically for the Great Lakes 
(e.g., sharp, fast, and shallow hulls) (Crisman 
1989, 2014a, 2014c; Malcomson 2004). For his 
smaller armed barges, Eckford had access to 
plans drafted in 1813 by William Doughty, the 
chief naval constructor of the U.S. Navy 
during the War of 1812 (Malcomson 2004). The 
introduction of centrally planned construction 
can be traced to the 17th century in the Royal 
Navy, but the U.S. adopted the practice more 
slowly (Winklareth 2000). For example, Noah 
Brown used the Doughty draught to build the 
row galley Allen on Lake Champlain, but made 
several alterations to the design to simplify the 
construction and to adapt to shortages in 
particular shapes of wood (Emery 2003, 2014). 
It is unknown whether or how Eckford 
changed the Doughty plan to accommodate 
issues of available materials, time constraints, 
the environment of Lake Ontario, or his ego. 
Analysis of the Doughty draft, Allen, and a 
Lake Ontario armed barge would contribute to 
a better understanding of how this early attempt 
at centralized control of ship construction was 
put into practice, how effective it was, and 
how it led to the development of the more 
formal modern navy.
 Similarly, the massive accumulation of 
labor and materials required to build, not only 
the 15 gunboats, but also the 6 warships 
begun, if not completed, during 1814, argues 
for significant organization on the part of the 
U.S. Navy and Henry Eckford. There has been 
no study of how this organization translated 
into vessels, but other fleets built under times 
of war stress, such as Benedict Arnold’s Lake 
Champlain fleet of the Revolutionary War and 
the Emergency Fleet of World War I, suggest 
the employment of systematized construction 
to speed shipbuilding (Bratten 1997; 
Winklareth 2000; Thiesen 2006). Systematized 
construction burgeoned as the 19th century 
progressed, and shipbuilding became more 
industrialized. Ultimately, ship construction 
transitioned from a craft to an industry, and 
the American Lake Ontario squadron, the 
armed barges in particular, may represent an 
early stage in that transition. There is much 
more to be learned from these vessels.
to Lake Ontario and rapid shipbuilding. The 
known British vessels demonstrate a wide 
variety of building techniques, suggesting a 
lack of centralized control, but it is currently 
unknown whether the American shipbuilders, 
under the direction of Henry Eckford at Sackets 
Harbor, employed more or less standardized 
techniques.
 Ultimately, the study of the Lake Ontario 
squadrons may be important beyond the history 
of the War of 1812. Henry Eckford was a 
master of his trade (Chapelle 1949). He trained 
Isaac Webb, who, in turn, trained John 
Griffiths and Donald McKay, all giants of 19th-
century shipbuilding. The War of 1812 was a 
pivotal time for Eckford, and it has been argued 
that his Lake Ontario designs influenced his 
later work and that of his apprentices 
(Crisman 1989, 2014a). Eckford’s Lake Ontario 
designs, unfortunately, are currently missing, 
if they ever existed. It is possible that he took 
them to Turkey, where he spent the end of his 
career building warships for the Ottoman 
Empire, but, at present, the only record of his 
Lake Ontario work is the archaeological 
record. An archaeological evaluation of his 
work, beyond Jefferson, will allow a fuller 
understanding of the development of 
American shipbuilding generally and the 
clipper ship specifically.
 It is also possible that the yet-undiscovered 
War of 1812 shipwrecks in Lake Ontario might 
shed light on the development of the modern 
navy. In particular, the armed barges may contain 
information about the use of centrally 
designed ship draughts to plan vessels built at 
remote naval stations and the employment of 
systematized construction techniques in the 
mass-production of vessels. Both these practices 
were in their infancy in the U.S. at the time of 
the War of 1812, but were widely adopted in 
merchant and naval construction by mid-
century (Thiesen 2006).
 Prior to the 19th century, the majority of 
warships built in the U.S. were designed and 
constructed at individual shipyards. In these 
instances, the constructor or shipwright would 
plan and oversee construction of the vessel 
from start to finish and would have sole 
responsibility for its characteristics (Chapelle 
1949; Goldenberg 1976). This independent 
approach to ship construction is evident in the 
large vessels built at Sackets Harbor. Henry 
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